Td Waterhouse Opsjoner Trading Seminar

Du får aldri jobb hvis du ikke har godt svar på dette ofte stilte intervjuespørsmål Velg riktig svar for å finne ut om du er forberedt på et vellykket jobbintervju. Hvorfor ønsker du denne jobben Velg riktig svar: Jeg ønsker å få kunnskap og erfaring i denne arbeidslinjen. Denne jobben tilbyr langsiktig karriereutvikling. Denne jobben er en ekte mulighet for meg å vokse og utvikle. Jeg kan få innvirkning og gi fordel for selskapet Denne jobben vil hjelpe meg med å anta et annet nivå i min karriere. Test ditt jobbintervju Ferdigheter Takk for at du tok deg tid til å intervjue med oss, men weve bestemte oss for å ansette noen andre. Ingen arbeidssøker ønsker å høre disse ordene etter intervjuet. Merk Svare på dette jobbsøkespørsmålet feil kan koste deg din nye jobbKommandere en av seks typer giganter og hevder retten til å herske over alle gigantkindene i, Giant Assault - Tilgjengelig nå Samarbeide med andre spillere for å tvinge undead tilbake gjennom tomrummet I det nye kortspillet, The Banishing Pre-Order Today, Mind Flayer Trophy Plaque er sikker på å ta tak i alles oppmerksomhet (ingen tankekontroll er nødvendig). - Pre-Order Today Marvel Dice Masters: Iron Man and War Machine avslører versjoner av Iron Mans rustning ALDRI FØR SE I Dice Masters Få det nå Spille fantastiske spill, vinn konvensjonen eksklusive premier, og støtte lokale spillbutikker Hendelser begynner 4. februar 2017 - Registrer deg for WKO Winter 2017 Today The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Dice Masters: Heroes i et halvt Shell Box Set har enda flere av skilpaddsaksjonen, du vil elske Tilgjengelig nå Dekorer ditt slott, trone rom eller oppholdsrom med denne fantastiske rekreasjonen av Dungeons Dragons Red Dragon - Tilgjengelig nå Hjelper, skurker og monstre fra Glemt Rikene vender tilbake med DD Ikoner av Rikene: Monster Menagerie II - Tilgjengelig nå WizKids bringer mer terningrollende moro til bordplaten med ny utgivelse, Dice Stars - Tilgjengelig nå Kaste staver og konkurrere mot andre veivisere i en episk løp for loot Rock Paper Wizard er et spennende festspill for 3-6 spillere - Tilgjengelig nå Burkes Gambit Tilgjengelig Nå Gjør deg klar for A n Edge of Your Seat Thriller Set In Space Klikk denne banneren for å lære mer Blank White Dice, designet av Jonathan Leistiko, er en spennende ny ta på terningspill. Tilgjengelig nå Score dine offisielle WizKids-skjorter, hettejakker, merchandise og mer. Samle dine heltter, bygg opp lagene dine og beseire fiender i de mange verdener i HeroClix-verdenen. I HeroClix kan du være helten du har drømt om eller skurken til marerittene dine. Med tusenvis av tegn å velge mellom og kart over terreng fra hele universet, hvem vet hvor HeroClix tar deg. Attack Wing er et raske taktisk kamp miniatyrspill, med samlebare figurer basert på Star Trek Universe og Dungeons Dragons Forgotten Realms. Bruke FlightPath manøvreringssystemet, beordrer hæren din i episk kamp, ​​tilpass hæren din med utstyr, våpen, spesielle evner og mer. Dice Masters er et smash-hit cross-brand-tilbud som benytter WizKids proprietære Dice Building Game-plattform hvor spillerne samler og monterer sitt lag av karakter terninger og kamp i head-to-head spill. Som med Quarriors, spillet som sparket av Dice Building Games, Michael Elliott og Eric M. Lang leder designarbeidet for det som sikkert kommer til å være på de fleste folkeselskaper. Hillside, NJ 17. februar 2017 WizKids er glad for å kunngjøre utgivelsen av Marvel Dice Masters: Iron Man og War Machine Starter Set på vennlige lokale spillbutikker i USA. Designet av Mike Elliott og Eric M. Lang, Marvel Dice Masters: Iron Man og War Machine Starter Set utvider seg på det terningkastende spillet, Dice Masters, og er sikker på å føre til flammende terningslag på bordplaten. HILLSIDE, NJ 16. februar 2017 Det kommende brettspillet The Expanse, basert på Syfy hit-tv-serien med samme navn, vil bli utgitt i juni som kunngjort av WizKids president Justin Ziran. HILLSIDE, NJ 15. februar 2017 WizKids, bransjeleder i kvalitetsmalmte plastminiaturer og utgiver av premium bordplater og tilbehør, er glad for å kunngjøre at Assault of the Giants Board Game nå er tilgjengelig over hele Nord-Amerika. NY RELEASE Angrep av Giants Assault of the Giants er et nytt Dungeons amp Dragons brettspill designet av Andrew Parks som utfordrer spillerne til å beordre en av seks typer giganter og kreve retten til å herske over alle giantkind. CURRENT EVENT Spill hvor som helst Caisse dept et placement du Qubec har i dag gitt ut sine finansielle resultater for kalenderåret 2016, og legger ut en 10,2 års årlig avkastning. La Caisse de Dpt et Placement du Qubec offentliggjorde i dag sine finansielle resultater for året som ble avsluttet 31. desember 2016. Den årlige vektede gjennomsnittlige avkastningen på sine kunder8217 midler nådde 10,2 over fem år og 7,6 i 2016. Netto eiendeler utgjorde 270,7 milliarder kroner, øker med 111,7 milliarder over fem år. med netto investeringsresultat på 100 milliarder og 11,7 milliarder i netto innskudd fra sine kunder. I 2016 nådde netto investeringsresultat 18,4 milliarder kroner og netto innskudd utgjorde 4,3 milliarder kroner. I løpet av fem år gir forskjellen mellom la Caisse8217s og dennes referanseportefølje mer enn 12,3 milliarder kroner av verdiskaping for sine kunder. I 2016 var forskjellen tilsvarende 4,4 milliarder kroner av verdiøkning. Caisse og referanseporteføljen returnerer 8220Og strategi, fokusert på rigorøst aktivutvalg, fortsetter å levere solide resultater, 8221 sa Michael Sabia, konsernsjef for La Caisse. 8220Over fem år, til tross for vesentlig forskjellige markedsforhold fra år til år, genererte vi en årlig avkastning på 10,2,8221 8220On den økonomiske fronten er det grunnleggende problemet det samme: Langsom global vekst, forverret av lavinvesteringsinvesteringer. Samtidig er det også betydelige geopolitiske risikoer. Med tanke på den relative selvtilfredsheten til markedene, må vi vedta en forsiktig tilnærming.8221 8220.Men å ta en forsiktig tilnærming betyr det ikke passivitet, fordi det er muligheter til å bli beslaglagt i dette miljøet. Gjennom vår globale eksponering, vår tilstedeværelse i Qubec, og nøyaktigheten av våre analyser og prosesser, er vi godt posisjonert til å gripe de beste mulighetene i verden og møte noen headwinds, tilføyde Mr. Sabia 8221. RETURNS PÅ AKTIVITETER AV AKTUELL KLASS Hensikten med strategien som la Caisse har implementert i sju år fokuserer på en absolutt avkastningsstrategi for å velge de høyeste verdipapirene og eiendelene, basert på grunnleggende analyser. La Caisse8217s strategi har også til formål å øke sin eksponering mot globale markeder og styrke innvirkningen i Qubec. Resultatet er en veldiversifisert portefølje som genererer verdi utover markedene og gir langsiktig stabilitet. Obligasjoner: Utviklingen i bedriftsmarkedet utfordrer Obligasjonsporteføljen, totalt mer enn 68 milliarder kroner, ga 3,9 avkastning over fem år, høyere enn referanseindeksen. Forskjellen tilsvarer verdiskapningen på 1,6 milliarder kroner. Verdipapirer fra offentlige og private selskaper og den aktive styringen av kredittspreadene bidro spesielt til porteføljens returnering. I 2016, til tross for en økning i renten ved utgangen av året, hadde porteføljen en avkastning på 3,1. Den drar nytte av fortsatt investering i vekstmarkedsgjeld og av solid gjeldsforpliktelse, særlig innen industrisektoren. Offentlig egenkapital: Vedvarende avkastning over fem år og det kanadiske markedet i 2016 I løpet av femårsperioden nådde den årlige avkastningen av hele Public Equity-porteføljen 14,1. I tillegg til å demonstrere solid markedsvekst i løpet av perioden, har avkastningen overgått referansenivået, noe som reflekterer porteføljen8217s brede diversifisering, fokus på kvalitetspapirer og velvalgte partnere i vekstmarkedene. Globale kvalitets-, Canada - og vekstmarkedsmandatene genererte henholdsvis årlig avkastning på 18,6, 10,6 og 8,1, og skaper 5,8 milliarder kroner av verdiskaping. For 2016 reflekterer 4,0-avkastningen på Global Quality-mandatet avskrivningen av internasjonale valutaer mot den kanadiske dollar. Mandatet fortsatte å være mye mindre volatilt enn markedet. Canada-mandatet, med en retur på 22,7, har hatt fordel av et robust kanadisk marked, drevet av utvinningen i olje - og råvarepriser og den finansielle sektoren8217s solid ytelse, spesielt i andre halvår. Mindre likvide eiendeler: globalisering godt i gang og solid ytelse De tre porteføljene av mindre likvide eiendeler 8211 Fast eiendom, Infrastruktur og Private Equity 8211 oppnådde en 12,3 årsavkastning over fem år, som viste solid og stabil resultat over tid. I løpet av denne perioden har investeringer nådd mer enn 60,1 milliarder kroner. I 2016 ble 2,4 milliarder investert i vekstmarkeder, inkludert 1,3 milliarder i India, hvor vekstutsikter er gunstige, og strukturreformer er godt i gang. De mindre likvide eiendelporteføljene er sentrale for La Caisse8217s globaliseringsstrategi, med eksponering utenfor Canada nå i dag 70. Nærmere bestemt, i fast eiendom. Ivanho Cambridge investerte 5,8 milliarder kroner, og den geografiske og sektorbaserte diversifiseringsstrategien fortsatte å utføre. I USA kjøpte Caisse-datterselskapet de resterende interessene i 330 Hudson Street og 1211 Avenue of the Americas i New York og fullførte byggingen av River Point-kontorstårnet i Chicago. I boligbransjen ga strategien i byer som London, San Francisco og New York og den jevne etterspørselen etter boligeiendommer gode resultater. I Europa fullførte Ivanho Cambridge og partner TPG også salget av P3 Logistic Parks, en av de største eiendomsmeglingstransaksjonene på kontinentet i 2016. I Asia-Stillehavet, Ivanho Cambridge, kjøpte en interesse i selskapet LOGOS, investeringspartner innen logistikk, og fortsetter å investere i Shanghai, Singapore og Melbourne. I Private Equity. la caisse investerte 7,8 milliarder i løpet av det siste året, i godt diversifiserte markeder og næringer. Gjennom transaksjonene gjennomført i 2016 utviklet la Caisse strategiske partnerskap med grunnleggere, entreprenørfamilier og operatører som deler sin langsiktige visjon. I USA kjøpte den en betydelig eierandel i AlixPartners, et globalt rådgivende firma. La Caisse kjøpte også 44 interesser i det australske forsikringsselskapet Greenstone og investerte i det europeiske selskapet Eurofins, en verdensleder innen analytisk laboratorietesting av mat, miljø og farmasøytiske produkter. I India ble la Caisse en partner av Edelweiss, en leder i stressede eiendeler og spesialisert bedriftskreditt. Det investerte også i TVS Logistics Services, en indisk multinasjonal leverandør av tredjeparts logistikk tjenester. I infrastruktur. la caisse samarbeider med DP World, en av verdens største havneoperatører, for å skape en 5 milliarder investeringsplattform beregnet for havner og terminaler globalt. Plattformen, der la Caisse har en 45 aksje, inkluderer to kanadiske containerterminaler i Vancouver og Prince Rupert. I India8217s energisektoren kjøpte la Caisse 21 interesser i Azure Power Global, en av India8217s største solenergiprodusenter. I løpet av året har også la Caisse styrket sitt langvarige partnerskap med Australia8217s plenaregruppe ved å anskaffe 20 interesser i selskapet. Sammen har la Caisse og Plenary Group allerede investert i syv sosiale infrastrukturprosjekter i Australia. Konsekvens i Qubec: fokus på privat sektor I Qubec fokuserer la Caisse på den private sektoren, som driver økonomisk vekst. La Caisse8217s strategi er bygget opp rundt tre hovedprioriteter: vekst og globalisering, effektive prosjekter og innovasjon og neste generasjon. Vekst og globalisering I 2016 jobbet la Caisse tett sammen med Groupe Marcelle8217s ledergruppe da den kjøpte Lise Watier Cosmtiques for å skape det ledende canadiske selskapet i skjønnhetsbransjen. Det støttet også Moment Factory8217s opprettelse av en ny enhet dedikert til permanente multimedia infrastrukturprosjekter, og jobbet med Lasik MD under et oppkjøp i USA-markedet. Videre, ved å gi Fix Auto tilgang til sine nettverk, la Caisse tilrettelagt Fix Auto8217s utvidelse til Kina og Australia, hvor selskapet nå har rundt 100 kroppsforretninger. I våren 2016 annonserte CDPQ Infra, et datterselskap av la Caisse, et integrert, elektrisk kollektivtrafikknettverksprosjekt for å koble downtown Montral, South Shore, West Island, North Shore og flyplassen. Siden da har flere store skritt blitt gjennomført på Rseau lectrique mtropolitain (REM) prosjektet, med bygging planlagt til å begynne i 2017. I fast eiendom annonserte Ivanho Cambridge og partner Claridge sin intensjon om å investere 100 millioner i eiendomsprosjekter i Greater Montral-området. La Caisse8217s eiendomsdatterselskap fortsatte også med ulike konstruksjons - og revitaliseringsprosjekter i Qubec, inkludert de pågår på Carrefour de l8217Estrie i Sherbrooke, Maison Manuvie og Fairmont Queen Elizabeth-hotellet i Montral, samt på Place Ste-Foy og Quartier QB i Qubec By. Innovasjon og neste generasjon I den nye mediebransjen har la Caisse investert i Triotech, som designer, produserer og markedsfører ritt basert på en sensors opplevelse i Felix amp Paul Studios, spesialisert seg på oppretting av filmiske virtuelle virkelighetsopplevelser og i Stingray , en ledende multiplattforms musikkleverandør. La Caisse investerte også i Hopper, rangert blant de 10 beste mobilapplikasjonene i reisebransjen. Innenfor det elektriske økosystemet reinventerte la Caisse i Addnergie for å støtte company8217s distribusjonsplan, med sikte på å legge til 8000 nye ladestasjoner over Canada de neste fem årene. La Caisse8217s nye investeringer og forpliktelser i Qubec nådde 13,7 milliarder kroner, med 2,5 milliarder i 2016. Disse tallene inkluderer ikke investeringen i Bombardier Transportation og de 3,1 milliarder planlagte satsingen av la Caisse å gjennomføre REM-prosjektet . Per 31. desember var Caisse-eiendelene i Qubec 58,8 milliarder kroner, hvorav 36,9 milliarder kroner i privat sektor, noe som er en økning i private eiendeler i forhold til 2015. La Caisse8217s driftskostnader, inkludert ekstern administrasjonskostnader, utgjorde 501 millioner i 2016. Forholdet mellom utgifter var 20,0 cent per 100 av gjennomsnittlig netto eiendeler, et nivå som sammenligner seg gunstig med bransjen. Kredittvurderingsbyråene bekreftet la Caisse8217s investeringsverdier med stabile utsikter, nemlig AAA (DBRS), AAA (SampP) og Aaa (Moody8217s). OM CAISSE DE DPT ET PLACEMENT DU QUBEC Det er en langsiktig institusjonell investor som forvalter midler primært for offentlige og parapubliske pensjons - og forsikringsplaner. Per 31. desember 2016 hadde den 270,7 milliarder kroner i netto eiendeler. Som en av Canadas ledende institusjonelle fondforvaltere investerer CDPQ globalt i store finansmarkeder, private equity, infrastruktur og fast eiendom. For mer informasjon, besøk cdpq. følg oss på Twitter LaCDPQ eller se våre Facebook - eller LinkedIn-sider. Du kan se denne pressemeldingen og andre vedlegg her nederst på siden. Du kan også lese artikler om resultatene her. Jeg tror de samlede resultatene snakker for seg selv. Caisse overgikk sin referanse med 180 basispoeng i 2016, og enda viktigere. 110 basispoeng i løpet av de siste fem årene, og genererte 12,3 milliarder kroner av verdiskapning over referanseindeksen for sine kunder. Det foreligger ingen årsrapport ennå (kommer ut i april), men Caisse gir avkastning for de spesialiserte porteføljene for 2016 og årlig femårig avkastning (klikk på bildet): Som du kan se, genererte faste inntekter 2,9 i 2016 og slo referanseindeksen med 110 basispunkter og 3,7 årlig de siste fem årene, 600 basispoeng over referanseindeksen. I pressemeldingen står det: Obligasjonsporteføljen, totalt mer enn 68 milliarder kroner, ga 3,9 avkastning over fem år, høyere enn referanseindeksen. Forskjellen tilsvarer verdiskapningen på 1,6 milliarder kroner. Verdipapirer fra offentlige og private selskaper og den aktive styringen av kredittspreadene bidro spesielt til porteføljens returnering. I 2016, til tross for en økning i renten ved utgangen av året, hadde porteføljen en avkastning på 3,1. Den drar nytte av fortsatt investering i vekstmarkedsgjeld og av solid gjeldsforpliktelse, særlig innen industrisektoren. Med andre ord utgjorde Obligasjoner 1,6 milliarder av de 4,4 milliarder av verdiskapningen i 2016, eller 36 av verdiskapningen over det samlede fondets referanseindeks i fjor. Det er ekstremt imponerende for en obligasjonsportefølje, men jeg vil være forsiktig med å tolke disse resultatene fordi de foreslår at referanseporteføljen brukes til å evaluere den underliggende porteføljen, ikke reflekterer kredittrisikoen som blir tatt (dvs. lasting opp på fremvoksende markedskrav og bedriftsobligasjoner og ha en statsobligasjonsindeks som referanse). Jeg nevner dette fordi denne type utmerkelse i obligasjoner er ukjent, med mindre selvfølgelig lederene spiller spillmarkedet ved å ta mye mer kredittrisiko i forhold til det referanseporteføljen. Også verdt å merke seg hvordan utbyttet i eiendomsgjeld i løpet av det siste året og fem år bidro til den samlede rentekostnadens avkastning. Igjen tar dette bare mer kredittrisiko for å slå et referanseindeks, og alle som styrer en renteportefølje, vet nøyaktig hva jeg snakker om. Det er heller ikke noe hemmelighet at Caisses Fixed Income-teamet har kortsluttet lange obligasjoner de siste årene, og mister penger på bære og rolldown, så kanskje de bestemte seg for å ta på seg økende markedsrisiko og bedriftsgjeldsrisiko for å kompensere for disse tapene og at betalt seg skikkelig. Også, sikkerhetskopiering i amerikanske lange obligasjonsutbytter i fjor hjalp også dem dersom de var korte. Nå, før jeg får Marc Cormier og hele fastinntektsp teamet på Caisse hoppende sint (ikke vil komme på noe dårlig side), sier jeg ikke at disse resultatene er forferdelige - langt fra det, de er gode - men vi kan ringe Som spade en spade tok Caisse Fixed Income-teamet stor kredittrisiko for å overgå referanseindeksen i fjor, og dette må diskuteres i detalj i årsrapporten når den kommer ut i april. Caisse mener at festen er over for obligasjoner. Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec, Canada8217s nest største pensjonsfondssjef, reduserer sine obligasjonsbeholdninger og bruker mer ressurser til bedrifts - og eiendomsgjeld. 8220Festen er over, hvorfor82 skal vi omstrukturere denne porteføljen for å redusere investeringer i tradisjonelle obligasjoner og øke og diversifisere vår investering i kreditt, 8221 administrerende direktør Michael Sabia sa i Montreal fredag. Han sa at Caisse vil redusere mengden av renter i porteføljen og øke de neste årene med mindre likvide midler. Renteporteføljen vil bli splittet i to deler: Tradisjonell rente - føderale og provinsielle kanadiske obligasjoner - som vil bli 8220 signifikant mindre, 8221 og en annen del basert på kreditt, for eksempel kreditt og eiendomsgjeld, sa han. 8220We8217 kommer til å legge større vekt på å bygge den porteføljen fordi vi tror det kan tilby oss fortsatt et relativt lavt nivå av risiko, men noe høyere avkastning, 8221 sa han om den kredittfokuserte planen. Investeringer i kanadiske provinsielle og føderale obligasjoner vil ikke krympe dramatisk, men litt etter litt, 8221 sa han. Merk: Jeg liker privatgjeld som en aktivaklasse, men er uenig, det er ikke begynnelsen på slutten på obligasjoner. Bortsett fra Obligasjoner, hva merket jeg igjen? Veldig kort, gode resultater i Fast eiendom, som overgikk sine referanser med 320 basispoeng i 2016. Over De siste fem årene har eiendomsmegling imidlertid underprestert sitt referanseindeks med 400 basispoeng. Igjen, et ord med forsiktighet for de fleste som ikke forstår hvordan man leser disse resultatene riktig. Referansen som Caisse bruker for å evaluere eiendomsporteføljen, er mye vanskeligere å slå enn noen av sine store eiere i Canada. Ive sa det før, og jeg sier det igjen, datterselskapet Caisses Real Estate, Ivanho Cambridge. gjør en virkelig god jobb, og det er en av de beste eiendomsinvesteringene i verden. Når det gjelder infrastruktur, slår CDPQ Infra sitt referanseindeks i 2016 med 30 basispunkter, men den går etter 250 basispunkter de siste fem årene. Igjen er referansen i Infrastruktur veldig vanskelig å slå, så jeg bekymrer meg ikke om denne underprestasjonen de siste fem årene. På samme måte som i fast eiendom, er menneskene som jobber på CDPQ Infra bokstavelig talt en rase fra hverandre, infrastruktureksperter i Brownfield og Greenfield-prosjekter. Da Michael Sabia nylig kom ut for å forsvare Montreal REM-prosjektet. han var altfor høflig. Jeg satte opp posten rett på bloggen min og holdt meg ikke igjen, men det forundrer meg hvor mange kakerlakker fortsatt lurker der ute, og spørsmålet om Caisses governance på dette prosjektet (hva en vits, de har en åpenbar agenda mot Caisse og dette unike prosjektet, men Michael Sabias mandat ble fornyet i fire år, så han vil få den siste latteren når den er ferdig og operativ). I Private Equity var utmerkelsen over indeksen i 2016 spektakulær (520 basispunkter eller 5,2), men i de siste fem årene er det en beskjeden utmerkelse (120 basispoeng). Som andre store kanadiske pensjoner investerer Caisse i topp private equity-fond over hele verden, og det gjør mange saminvesteringer for å redusere overordnede avgifter. Merk: Andreas Beroutsos, som tidligere overvåket alle La Caisse8217s private equity og infrastrukturinvesteringsaktiviteter utenfor Quebec, er ikke lenger der (hørte noen ubestemte og interessante historier). I april reorganiserte Caisse infrastruktur og private equity-enheter under nye ledere. I Public Equities, en meget imponerende ytelse i Canada, overgikk benchmarken med 260 basispoeng i 2016 og med 160 basispunkter de siste fem årene. Global Quality-porteføljen utviste referanseindeksen med 30 basispoeng i 2016, men den har fortsatt overgått det med nesten 500 basispunkter de siste fem årene. Igjen spør jeg denne Global Quality-porteføljen og referansen de bruker for å evaluere den, og jeg har åpenbart sagt om det er så bra, hvorfor arent andre store kanadiske pensjonskasser gjør nøyaktig samme ting (Svar: det passerer ikke sine brett lukttest. Hvis disse gutta er så gode, de burde jobbe for Warren Buffet, ikke Caisse) Det er det fra meg, jeg har allerede dekket nok. Ta deg tid til å gå over årsrapporten for 2015 mens du venter på 2016 som skal vises i april. Der finner du alle slags detaljer som referansene som styrer de spesialiserte porteføljene (klikk på bildet): Som jeg sa, er det ingen gratis lunsjer i eiendoms - og infrastrukturmål, men det er problemer med andre referanser som ikke reflekterer risikoen ved å være tatt i de underliggende porteføljene (for eksempel Obligasjoner og Global Quality porteføljer, for eksempel). Netto, nettopp, men jeg vil si at referansene som Caisse bruker, er fortsatt blant de tøffeste i Canada, og det har levert solide, kortsiktige og viktigere, langsiktige resultater. Det er en tøff jobb som styrer disse porteføljene og slår disse referansene, jeg vet, jeg har vært der, og folk skjønner ikke hvor vanskelig det er, spesielt over et gitt år. Derfor legger jeg først og fremst vekt på langsiktige resultater, de eneste som virkelig teller. Og langsiktige resultater er det som teller når det gjelder å kompensere Caisses seniorledere (fra 2015 årsrapport, klikk på bildet): Igjen er Beroutsos ikke lenger med Caisse, og heller ikke Bernard Morency. Du kan se medlemmene av Caisses Executive Committee her (en bemerkelsesverdig tillegg i fjor var Jean Michel, Executive Vice President, Innskytere og Total Portefølje han har et sterkt rykte og hjalp Air Canadas pensjonsoppgang fra asken for å bli fullt finansiert igjen) . Den andre tingen verdt å nevne er at Caisses-lederne blir betalt rettferdig, men er fortsatt underbetalt i forhold til deres jevnaldrende på store kanadiske midler (fuzzy benchmarks på andre butikker spiller en rolle her, men også kulturen i Quebec hvor folk blir sjalu og sint hvis pensjonskasse ledere som administrerer milliarder får betalt millioner dollar pluss pakker, selv om det er det de virkelig er verdt). Jeg vil legge inn klipp fra Caisses pressekonferanse som de blir tilgjengelige, så kom tilbake for å se denne kommentaren. Hvis du har noe å legge til, vennligst send meg en e-post på LKolivakisgmail. Nedenfor snakker Michael Sabia med Mutsumi Takahashi i CTV News Montreal-studioene 20. desember 2016. Lytt nøye til hva han sier om REM-prosjektet, adresser kritikerne, og hva han sier om Quebec-selskaper som opererer på globale markeder. Utmerket diskusjon her. Også, Scott Rechler, RXR Realty CEO, var på CNBC i morges og snakket om hvorfor det er fornuftig å finansiere infrastrukturprosjekter gjennom PPP. Veldig interessant diskusjon, på et tidspunkt mot slutten, sa han at det kostet 500 millioner kroner å bygge en metro i Paris og Tokyo, men det kostet 2 milliarder kroner for å bygge de to siste metrostasjonene i New York City på grunn av alle regelverket og byråkrati. Til slutt, ta deg tid til å støtte denne bloggen ved å donere eller abonnere på den under bildet mitt på høyre side. Jeg takker alle dere som tar deg tid til å vise økonomisk støtte, det er høyt verdsatt, og jeg ber om at andre gjør det samme. Jeg jobber veldig hardt for å gi deg innsikt i pensjoner og investeringer, så vær så snill å bidra til å støtte min innsats. Takk skal du ha. Hema Parmar fra Bloomberg-rapporter, Gotham Hedge Fund Explores Skiftende avgifter til Tie Pay to Returns: Gotham Asset Management. Den 6 milliarder pengeforvalteren som drives av Joel Greenblatt og Robert Goldstein, undersøker en ny avgiftsstruktur som binder mer av fond8217s til ytelse. Firmaet er i samtaler med noen investorer for hedgefondet Gotham Neutral Strategies om å belaste en avgift: Jo større av en 1 prosent administrasjonsavgift eller 30 prosent av avkastningen som overstiger fund8217s benchmark, ifølge to personer som er kjent med saken. Aktiefondet belaster i dag 1,5 prosent av eiendelene i forvaltningskostnader og 20 prosent av fortjenesten, sa en av folket. Hedgefond har trimmet og endret sine gebyrer i løpet av en tilbakeslag over mangelfulle avkastninger og kritikk at standardmodellen for å belaste et 2 prosent administrasjonsgebyr og en 20 prosent incitamentsavgift er for dyrt. De fleste hedgefondene belaster investorer for mye for ytelsen de leverer, Greenblatt, som er Gotham8217s co-chief investment officer, fortalte Bloomberg Television i et intervju i mai 2014. Gotham Neutral Strategies-fondet fikk 7,5 prosent i fjor, ifølge en annen person kjent med saken. HFRI Market Neutral Index var på om lag 2 prosent på den tiden. Siden begynnelsen i juli 2009 har fondet oppnådd en årlig 7 prosent. Hvis den nye avgiftsstrukturen er vedtatt, vil Gotham bli med i Hong Kong-baserte hedgefond Myriad Asset Management og andre i å flytte til 1-eller-30-modellen, som har blitt drevet av investorer, inkludert Texas Teacher Retirement System. Fra midten av februar er minst 16 multi-milliarder dollar hedgefond over hele verden enten i ferd med å implementere eller har implementert 1 eller 30 avgiftsstrukturen som ble introdusert til næringen i fjerde kvartal 2016, Jonathan Koerner av Albourne Partners sa i et telefonsamtale den 16. februar. 8220 Målet med 82161 eller 308217 er å konsekvent sikre at investor beholder 70 prosent av alfa generert for investering i et hedgefond, skrev 8221 Koerner i et vitbok publisert i Desember av Albourne, som rådgiver klienter på mer enn 400 milliarder av alternative investeringer globalt. Forvaltningsavgiftene som belastes i et år når fondet underpresterer referansepunktene, trekkes fra det følgende år8217s ytelsesavgift, noe som gjør at det i realiteten er en forhåndsbetalt ytelsesavgiftskredit, sa han i forrige måned. Gotham Penguin Fund, som satser på og mot amerikanske aksjer, fikk 25 prosent i fjor, ifølge en av de som er kjent med saken, sammenlignet med en 5,4 prosent økning i HFRI Equity Hedge Index. Siden begynnelsen i 2013 har fondet returnert en årlig 15 prosent. En representant for firmaet nektet å kommentere. Så hva handler dette om? I utgangspunktet er Joel Greenblatt of Gotham riktig, de fleste hedgefondene belaster investorer for mye for ytelsen de leverer, og han foreslår noe for bedre å justere interessene med sine investorer. Hvorfor er ikke hvert stort hedgefond å gjøre dette? Kort sagt, fordi de ikke vil, helt tilfredsstillende å akselerere sine investorer med vanvittige avgifter, uansett hvordan de utfører, eller de trenger ikke fordi de gjør det bra og har en ta det eller la den holdes når det gjelder sine gebyrer. Tidligere var det alltid underperformerende hedgefond hva ville foreslå lavere avgifter til investorer. Men her har vi en kjent, høyt respektert hedgefondssjef som har utført godt gjennom årene, og sier at konserten er oppe og han foreslår noe bedre for sine investorer. Dessverre er jeg ikke sikker på at denne fantastiske 1 OR 30 avgiftsstrukturen kommer til å få trekkraft, uansett hvor mye sving Albourne har. Jeg hadde en utveksling med Dimitri Douaire, tidligere OPTrust, om dette emnet på LinkedIn (klikk på bildet nedenfor). Nå kan jeg være uenig med Dimitri om hvorvidt å gi bedre vilkår til nye hedgefond, er et tilskudd eller om flere milliarder - dollar hedgefond bør ta betalt noen lederavgift i det hele tatt, men hes rett, med mindre flertallet av investorer begynner å implementere denne avgiftsstrukturen på tvers av alle sine investeringer, det kommer ikke til å få trekkraft. Du kan lese mer om Albournes 1 eller 30 gebyrstruktur her. I teorien er det perfekt fornuftig, vi må bare vente et tiår for å se om det får noen trekkraft. Nedenfor, et eldre (2011) Fortune intervju hvor Joel Greenblatt snakker om hvordan man kan slå markedet (se transkripsjon her). Lytt nøye til hans kommentarer, veldig interessant, og husk, jeg sporer Gothams portefølje hvert kvartal sammen med andre legendariske investorer når jeg går over toppfondsaktivitet. I fjor snakket Greenblatt også med Morningstar om å velge aktive ledere. Du kan se det intervjuet her og lese transkripsjonen også. Det er utmerket og vel verdt å lytte til. Til slutt er det ofte at en svært vellykket sikringsfondssjef med en vinnende strategi lukker butikken, men det er akkurat det Joel Greenblatt gjorde i 1995. Det er like uvanlig å komme tilbake i virksomheten mer enn et tiår senere med en dramatisk endret strategi . Greenblatt dukket opp på WealthTrack i 2014 for å diskutere hans store endring i porteføljestrategi, fra en svært konsentrert tilnærming til bred diversifisering. Se dette intervjuet nedenfor. I en nylig bloggkommentar lider Yves Smith av naken kapitalisme, fortsetter CalPERS8217 Private Equity Portfolio å tjene altfor lite for risikoen: We8217ve sa de siste par år at private equity ikke har tjent nok til å kompensere for de ekstra risikoene, det med høy innflytelse og mangel på likviditet. En av de viktigste prinsippene for økonomi er at ekstra risikovurdering bør belønnes med høyere avkastning over tid. Men for mer enn det siste tiåret har de typiske investorporteføljene av private equity-fondene, harbor8217t, levert tilleggsavkastningen, typisk gjengitt på 300 basispoeng over et offentlig aksjemarked som SampP 500. We8217ve påpekte at selv den utbredte benchmarken er for smigrende. Private equity-selskaper investerer i selskaper som er mye mindre enn medlemmene av SampP 500, noe som betyr at de er i stand til å vokse i raskere grad over lengre perioder. 300 basispoeng (3) premie er en konvensjon uten solid analytisk grunnlag. Noen tidligere sjefsinvesteringer, som Andrew Silton, har hevdet at en mye høyere premie, mer som 500 til 800 basispoeng (5 til 8), er mer hensiktsmessig. Og det er før du kommer til andre utbredte problemer med å måle avkastning på private aksjer, for eksempel at de regelmessig overdrives på bestemte tidspunkter, nemlig rett før et nytt fond blir reist av samme generelle partner, sent i et fund8217s liv, og under bjørnemarkeder, som alle sammen gir resultater. Og that8217s før du kommer til det faktum at noen investorer bruker enda flatterende benchmarks. Som Oxford professor Ludovic Phalippou påpekt via e-post, de siste to årene, har flere og flere investorer byttet fra å bruke den allerede sjenerøse SampP 500 til MSCI World Index som referanse. Hvorfor Per Phalippou: 8220 Fordi SampP 500 har vært veldig bra de siste tre årene, i motsetning til MSCI World Index.8221 Så hvorfor har private equity vært å produsere nok det siste tiåret for å rettferdiggjøre de høye kostnadene Det korte svaret er for mye penger jager avtaler. Private equity8217s andel av global egenkapital er mer enn doblet fra 2005 til 2014. Og du kan se hvordan dette ser ut i CalPERS8217s siste private equity-prestasjonsoppdatering, fra investeringskomiteens møte i forrige uke (fra side 14 i denne rapporten). I rettferdighet har CalPERS en strengere private equity-referanse enn mange av sine jevnaldrende (klikk på bildet): Siden diagrammet fremdeles er mektig vanskelig å lese (ved design), går let8217s gjennom havet av lese blekk. Den eneste perioden i hvilken CalPERS slo sitt referanseindeks, var for måneden før måledatoen 31. desember 2016, og det med en hel del 3 basispoeng. I alle andre målingsperioder var mangelen hundrevis av grunnpoeng: 3 måneder (219) Fiscal YTD (283) 1 år (994) 3 år (132) 5 år (479) 10 år (286) Til kreditt har CalPERS har kuttet sin private equity-tildeling. CalPERS hadde et private equity mål på 14 i 2012 og 2013, det annonserte i desember i desember, var det å redusere det fra 10 til 8. Som så mange av sine jevnaldrende, håpet CalPERS at private equity ville redde den fra underfinansieringen, som skyldtes både på grunn av beslutningen om å kutte midler i løpet av dot com-epoken, da CalPERS ble overfinansiert, og til skaden den pådro seg under krisen. I det minste lukker CalPers til slutt kaffen. Men selv med disse forferdelige resultatene har CalPERS en annen avenue: den kan forfølge private equity på egenhånd, noe som nesten ville eliminere de estimerte 700 basispoengene (7) det betaler til private equity fondforvaltere. CalPERS bekreftet dette estimatet av Ludovic Phalippou i sin private equity workshop i november 2015. Siden den gang hadde det samlet inn egenkapitalbærekostnadsdata, det vil si de fulle gebyrene og kostnadene er minst det høye, ville det antagelig ha rapportert et lavere tall eller flagget figuren som en høy pluggfigur. Å kvitte seg med avgiften vil bety mye mer tilbake til CalPERS og sine pensjonister, og ville gjøre private equity mer levedyktige. CalPERS har to måter det kan gå. En ville være en offentlig markeder replikasjon strategi, som ville målrette den typen selskaper private equity bedrifter kjøpe. Akademikere har modellert ulike implementeringer av denne ideen, og de viser solide 12-14 avkastninger. However, as we8217ve discussed at length, and some pubic pension funds have even admitted, one of the big attractions of private equity is8230drumroll8230 the very way the mangers lie about valuations, particularly in bad equity markets Private equity managers shamelessly pretend that the value of their companies falls less when stocks are in bear territory, giving the illusion that private equity usefully counters portfolio volatility. Anyone with an operating brain cell knows that absent exceptional cases, levered equities will fall more that less heavily geared ones. So the reporting fallacy of knowing where you really stand makes this idea unappetizing to investors . The other way to go about it would be to have an in-house team that does private equity investing. A group of Canadian public pension funds has gone this route and not surprisingly, reports markedly better results net of fees than industry norms . And this is becoming more mainstream, as Reuters reported last Friday (hat tip DO): Some of the world8217s biggest sovereign wealth funds are increasingly striking their own private equity deals rather than relying on external fund managers, in a drive to cut costs and gain more control. With some 6.5 trillion in assets, sovereign investors already account for 19 percent of capital committed to private equity, according to data from research firm Preqin. But mega-funds such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Saudi Arabia8217s Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Singapore8217s GIC, are hiring specialists to find or vet deals 8211 enabling them to negotiate with private equity firms from a position of strength or to go it alone . In 2012 sovereign investors participated in just 77 direct private equity deals. By 2016, that had risen to 137, Thomson Reuters data shows. Deal value more than trebled to 45.2 billion from 14.8 billion 8230. This allows funds to better protect their interests when markets go south. One sovereign investor who spoke on condition of anonymity said that during the global financial crisis, some external funds behaved irrationally . 8220They had different liability streams than us, so they were under pressure to sell at a time when they should have been investing more,8221 the source said. 8220Going more direct means you don8217t have to worry about whether your interests are aligned with other investors8217.8221 And to its credit CalPERS is considering joining this trend 8230after having been deterred from leading it. From a 2016 post : In 1999, CalPERS engaged McKinsey to advise them as to whether they should bring some of their private equity activities in house. My understanding was that some board members thought this issue was worth considering staff was not so keen (perhaps because they doubted they had the skills to do this work themselves and were put off by the idea of being upstaged by outside, better paid recruits). In hearing this tale told many years later, I was perplexed and a bit disturbed to learn that the former managing partner of McKinsey, Ron Daniel, presented the recommendations to CalPERS of not to go this route . Only a very few directors (as in the tenured class of partner) continue at McKinsey beyond normal retirement age one was the head of the important American Express relationship at the insistence of Amex. Daniel served as an ambassador for the firm as well as working on his former clients. Why was he dispatched to work on a one-off assignment that was clearly not important to McKinsey from a relationship standpoint, particularly in light of a large conflict of interest: that he was also the head of the Harvard Corporation, which was also a serious investor in private equity Although the lack of staff enthusiasm was probably a deal killer in and of itself, the McKinsey 8220no go8221 recommendation hinged on two arguments: the state regulatory obstacles (which in fact was not insurmountable CalPERS could almost certainly get a waiver if it sought one), and the culture gap of putting a private equity unit in a public pension fund . Even though the lack of precedents at the time no doubt made this seem like a serious concern, in fact, McKinsey clients like Citibank and JP Morgan by then had figured out how to have units with very divergent business cultures (investment banking versus commercial banking) live successfully under the same roof. And even at CalPERS now, there is a large gap between the pay levels, autonomy, and status of the investment professionals versus the rank and file that handles mundane but nevertheless important tasks like keeping on top of payments from the many government entities that are part of the CalPERS system, maintaining records for and making payments to CalPERS beneficiaries, and running the back office for the investment activities that CalPERS runs internally. Why do I wonder whether McKinsey had additional motives for sending someone as prominent as Daniel to argue forcefully (as he apparently did) that CalPERS reject the idea of doing private equity in house Clearly, if CalPERS went down that path, then as now, the objective would be to reduce the cost of investing in private equity. And it would take funds out of the hand of private equity general partners . The problem with that is that McKinsey had a large and apparently not disclosed conflict: private equity funds were becoming large sources of fees to the firm. By 2002, private equity firms represented more than half of total McKinsey revenues. CalPERS going into private equity would reduce the general partners8217 fees, and over time, McKinsey8217s. In keeping, as we pointed out in 2014. McKinsey acknowledged that the prospects for private equity continuing to deliver outsized returns were dimming . That would seem to make for a strong argument to get private equity firms to lower their fees, and the best leverage would be to bring at least some private equity investing in house, both to reduce costs directly and to provide for more leverage in fee discussions. Yet McKinsey hand-waved unconvincingly about ways that limited partners could contend with the more difficult investment environment, and was discouraging about going direct despite the fact that the Canadian pension funds had done so successfully. Better late than never. Let8217s hope CalPERS pursues this long-overdue idea. Yves Smith, aka Susan Webber of Aurora Advisors. is back at it again, going after CalPERS private equity program, enlisting academic experts like this professor at Oxford who sounds credible but the problem is like so many academics, he doesnt have a clue of what hes talking about, and neither does Yves Smith, unfortunately. Before Ludovic Phalippou, there was a blogger who warned the world of bogus benchmarks in illiquid asset classes and keeps hammering the point that its all about benchmarks stupid. This blogger even did a short stint on Yves blog, Naked Capitalism. before leaving to write for another popular blog for a brief while, Zero Hedge (I now post my comments only on my blog and Im much happier. My advice to bloggers is not to routinely post anywhere else even if they are popular blogs.). My views on benchmarking illiquid assets have evolved because I realize how hard it is to benchmark these assets properly (never mind what Yves and Phalippou think), but that doesnt mean we shouldnt pay attention to these benchmarks (we most certainly should). Ok, let me be fair here, Yves comment above is not ALL nonsense, but there are so many gaps here and the way the information is presented is so blatantly and foolishly biased that a relatively informed reader might read this comment and think CalPERS should just nuke its multi-billion PE program just like it nuked its hedge fund program a couple of years ago. Knowing what was going on at CalPERSs hedge fund program, I actually agreed with that decision. CalPERS never staffed that team appropriately, they didnt know what they were doing and the program produced very disappointing returns, year in, year out, net of billions in fees they were doling out to their lousy external hedge fund managers. Private equity at CalPERS was also one HUGE mess prior to the arrival of Ral Desrochers in May 2011 to head that group. Basically, up until then, CalPERS was everyones private equity cash cow, giving everyone and their mothers an allocation. Their program became one giant PE benchmark for the entire industry. The problem with that approach is it simply doesnt work, especially in private equity where there is a huge dispersion of returns between top funds and bottom funds and there is evidence of performance persistence (although the evidence is somewhat mixed pre and post-2000 ). When Ral Desrochers took over CalPERS PE program, he did what he did at CalSTRS, namely, clean it up, getting rid of underperformers and focusing on having a concentrated portfolio of a few top-performing funds . In others words, allocate more money in fewer and fewer funds, and watch them like a hawk to see if its worth reinvesting in new funds they raise. Its fair to say Ral Desrochers and his team inherited one huge private equity mess because theyre still cleaning up that portfolio, years after he got in power (that is something Yves neglects to mention). Still, private equity is an important asset class, one that has delivered excellent returns for CalPERS over the last 20 years . net of fees (click on image): As far as its benchmark, CalPERS started mulling over a new PE benchmark two years ago and I reviewed the latest publicly available annual PE program review (November, 2015) which states the current policy benchmark of 23 FTSE US 13 FTSE ROW (rest of world) 300 basis points creates unintended active risk for the Program, as well as for the Total Fund . (click on image): Now, instead of reading nonsense on Naked Capitalism, take the time to read this attachment on private equity that CalPERS put out in November 2015, its excellent and discusses performance persistence and the problems benchmarking private equity. I have long argued that the benchmark should be the SampP 500 300 basis points but the truth is the deals are increasingly outside the US and that 300 basis points spread to capture illiquidty and leverage is a bit high and this benchmark does expose the program and the Total Fund to active risk (ie. risk it underperforms its benchmark by a considerable amount) on any given year (not over the long run). Having said this, when I went over CalPERS fiscal 2016 results back in July, I said they werent good and that they were smearing lipstick on a pig : Lastly, and most importantly, lets go over CalPERSs news release, CalPERS Reports Preliminary 2015-16 Fiscal Year Investment Returns : The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) today reported a preliminary 0.61 percent net return on investments for the 12-month period that ended June 30, 2016. CalPERS assets at the end of the fiscal year stood at more than 295 billion and today stands at 302 billion. CalPERS achieved the positive net return despite volatile financial markets and challenging global economic conditions. Key to the return was the diversification of the Funds portfolio, especially CalPERS fixed income and infrastructure investments . Fixed Income earned a 9.29 percent return, nearly matching its benchmark. Infrastructure delivered an 8.98 percent return, outperforming its benchmark by 4.02 percentage points, or 402 basis points. A basis point is one one-hundredth of a percentage point. The CalPERS Private Equity program also bested its benchmark by 253 basis points, earning 1.70 percent . Positive performance in a year of turbulent financial markets is an accomplishment that we are proud of, said Ted Eliopoulos, CalPERS Chief Investment Officer. Over half of our portfolio is in equities, so returns are largely driven by stock markets. But more than anything, the returns show the value of diversification and the importance of sticking to your long-term investment plan, despite outside circumstances. This is a challenging time to invest, but well continue to focus on our mission of managing the CalPERS investment portfolio in a cost-effective, transparent, and risk-aware manner in order to generate returns for our members and employers, Eliopoulos continued . For the second year in a row, international markets dampened CalPERS Global Equity returns. However, the program still managed to outperform its benchmark by 58 basis points, earning negative 3.38 percent. The Real Estate program generated a 7.06 percent return, underperforming its benchmark by 557 basis points. The primary drivers of relative underperformance were the non-core programs, including realized losses on the final disposition of legacy assets in the Opportunistic program . Its important to remember that CalPERS is a long-term investor, and our focus is the success and sustainability of our system over multiple generations, said Henry Jones, Chair of CalPERS Investment Committee. We will continue to examine the portfolio and our asset allocation, and will use the next Asset Liability Management process, starting in early 2017, to ensure that we are best positioned for the future market climate. Todays announcement includes asset class performance as follows (click on image): Returns for real estate, private equity and some components of the inflation assets reflect market values through March 31, 2016 . CalPERS 2015-16 Fiscal Year investment performance will be calculated based on audited figures and will be reflected in contribution levels for the State of California and school districts in Fiscal Year 2017-18, and for contracting cities, counties, and special districts in Fiscal Year 2018-19. The ending value of the CalPERS fund is based on several factors and not investment performance alone . Contributions made to CalPERS from employers and employees, monthly payments made to retirees, and the performance of its investments, among other factors, all influence the ending total value of the Fund . The Board has taken many steps to sustain the Fund as part of CalPERS Asset Liability Management Review Cycle (PDF) that takes a holistic and integrated view of our assets and liabilities. You can read more articles on CalPERSs fiscal 2015-2016 results here. CalPERSs comprehensive annual report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2015 is not yet available but you can view last years fiscal year annual report here . I must admit I dont track US public pension funds as closely as Canadian ones but let me provide you with my insights on CalPERSs fiscal year results: First, the results arent that bad given that CalPERSs fiscal year ends at the end of June and global equity markets have been very volatile and weak. Ted Eliopoulos, CalPERSs CIO, is absolutely right: When 52 percent of your portfolio is achieving a negative 3.4 percent return, that certainly sets the main driver for the overall performance of the fund. In my last comment covering why bcIMC posted slightly negative returns during its fiscal 2016, I said the same thing, when 50 of the portfolio is in global equities which are getting clobbered during the fiscal year, its impossible to post solid gains (however, stocks did bounce back in Q2). Eliopoulos is also right, CalPERS and the entire pension community better prepare for lower returns and a lot more volatility ahead. Ive been warning about deflation and how it will roil pensions for a very long time. As far as investment assumptions, all US public pensions are delusional . Periode. CalPERS and everyone else needs to lower them to a much more realistic level. Forget 8 or 7, in a deflationary world, youll be lucky to deliver 5 or 6 annualized gains over the next ten years. CalPERS, the government of California and public sector unions need to all sit down and get real on investment assumptions or face the wrath of a brutal market which will force them to cut their investment assumptions or face insolvency. They should also introduce risk-sharing in their plans so that all stakeholders share the risks of the plan equally and spare California taxpayers the need to bail them out . What about hedge funds Did CalPERS make a huge mistake nuking its hedge fund program two years ago Absolutely not . That program wasnt run properly and the fees they were doling out for mediocre returns were insane. Besides, the party in hedge funds is over. Most pensions are rightly shifting their attention to infrastructure in order to meet their long dated liabilities. As far as portfolio returns, good old bonds and infrastructure saved them, both returning 9 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2016. In a deflationary world, you better have enough bonds to absorb the shocks along the way. And I will tell you something else, I expect the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan and the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan to deliver solid returns this year because they both understand liability driven investments extremely well and allocate a good chunk into fixed income (HOOPP more than OTPP). I wasnt impressed with the returns in CalPERSs Real Estate portfolio or Private Equity portfolio ( Note: Returns in these asset classes are as of end of March and will end up being a bit better as equities bounced back in Q2). The former generated a 7.06 percent return, underperforming its benchmark by 557 basis points and suffered relative underperformance in the non-core programs, including realized losses on the final disposition of legacy assets in the Opportunistic program. CalPERS Private Equity program bested its benchmark by 253 basis points, earning 1.70 percent, but that tells me returns in this asset class are very weak and the benchmark they use to evaluate their PE program isnt good (they keep changing it to make it easier to beat it) . So Im a little surprised that CalPERS new CEO Marcie Frost is eyeing to boost private equity . In a nutshell, those are my thoughts on CalPERS fiscal 2015-16 results. Is CalPERS smearing lipstick on a pig No, the market gives them and everyone else what the market gives and unless theyre willing to take huge risks, they need to prepare for lower returns ahead. But CalPERS and its stakeholders also need to get real in terms of investment projections going forward and they better have this conversation sooner rather than later or risk facing the wrath of the bond market (remember, CalPERS is a mature plan with negative cash flows and as interest rates decline, their liabilities skyrocket). CalPERS latest annual report for 2015-2016 is now available here. I stand by remarks that CalPERS Private Equity program is delivering paltry returns, but the truth is these are treacherous times for private equity and there is gross misalignment of interests going on. Even Canadas mighty PE investors arent returning what they used to in this asset class despite having developed much better capabilities to co-invest with their general partners (GPs) in larger transactions to lower overall fees. Here is something else Yves and her academic friend dont understand about what exactly is going on at Canadas large pensions and large sovereign wealth funds in terms of direct investments in private equity. The bulk of direct investing at Canadas large pensions is in the form of co-investments after they invested billions in comingled funds where they pay 2 amp 20 in fees . not in the form of purely direct (independent) private equity investments where they source their deals on their own, invest in a private company and fix up its operations. I explained the key points on private equity at large Canadian pensions in this comment : Private equity is an important asset class, making up on average 12 of the total assets at Canadas large public pensions. All of Canadas large public pensions invest in private equity primarily through external funds which they pay big fees to and are then able to gain access to co-investment opportunities where they pay no fees. In order to gain access to these co-investments, Canadas large pensions need to hire professionals with the right skill set to analyze these deals in detail and have quick turnaround time when they are presented with opportunities to co-invest. Some of Canadas large public pensions, like Ontario Teachers and OMERS, engage in purely direct (independent) private equity deals where they actually source deals on their own and then try to improve the operational efficiency of that private company. Apart from paying no fees, the added advantage of this approach is that unlike PE funds who try to realize gains in three or four years, pensions have a much longer investment horizon on these investments (ten years) and can wait a long time before these companies turn around. However, the performance of these type of purely direct (independent) deals is mixed with some successes and plenty of failures . Also, we simply dont have independently verifiable information on how much is truly allocated in independent direct deals versus fund investments and co-investments, and how well these independent direct deals have done over the long run relative to fund investments and co-investments. The reality is that despite their long investment horizon, Canadas large public pensions will never be able to compete effectively with the large private equity titans who are way more plugged into the best deals all around the world . This is why CPPIB, Canadas largest pension, focuses purely on fund investments and co-investments all around the world in their private equity portfolio. They will never engage in independent direct deals like they do in infrastructure. Their philosophy, and I totally agree with them . is that they simply cannot compete on direct deals with premiere private equity funds and its not in the best interests of their beneficiaries . Under the new leadership of Andr Bourbonnais, PSP Investments is also moving in this direction, as Guthrie Stewarts private equity team sells any independent direct stakes to focus its attention solely on fund investments and co-investments to reduce overall fees (again, I agree with this approach in private equity). CPPIB and PSP will be the worlds top private equity investors for a very long time as they both have a lot of money coming in and they will be increasingly allocating to top credit (private debt) and private equity funds that can make profitable long-term private investments all over the world. Ontario Teachers, the Caisse, bcIMC, OMERS and other large Canadian pensions will also continue to figure prominently on this list of top global private equity investors for a long time but they will lag CPPIB and PSP because they are more mature pensions with less money coming in. Still, private equity will continue to be an important asset class at these pensions for a long time. Last week, at the CFA Montreal lunch with PSPs Andr Bourbonnais. PSPs CEO stated these key points on their private equity program: Real estate is an important asset class to protect against inflation and it generates solid cash flows but cap rates are at historic lows and valuations are very stretched. In this environment, PSP is selling some of their real estate assets (see below, my discussion with Neil Cunningham) but keeping their trophy assets for the long run because if you sell those, its highly unlikely you will be able to buy them back. Same thing in private equity, they are very disciplined, see more downside risks with private companies so they work closely with top private equity funds (partners) who know how to add operational value, not just financial engineering (leveraging a company us to then sell assets). PSP is increasingly focused on private debt as an asset class, playing catch-up to other large Canadian pension funds (like CPPIB where he worked for ten years prior to coming to PSP). Andr said there will be a lot of volatility in this space but he thinks PSP is well positioned to capitalize on it going forward. He gave an example of a 1 billion deal with Apollo to buy home security company ADT last February, a deal that was spearheaded by David Scudellari, Senior Vice President, Principal Debt and Credit Investments at PSP Investments and a key manager based in New York City (see a previous comment of mine on PSPs global expansion ). This deal has led to other deals and since then, they have deployed 3.5 billion in private debt already ( very quick ramp-up ). PSP also recently seeded a European credit platform. David Allen8216s AlbaCore Capital, which is just ramping up now. I am glad Miville asked Andr about these platforms in private debt and other asset classes because it was confusing to me. Basically, hiring a bunch of people to travel the world to find deals is operationally heavy and not wise. With these platforms, they are not exactly seeding a hedge fund or private equity fund in the traditional sense, they own 100 of the assets in these platforms . negotiate better fees but pump a lot of money in them, allowing these external investment managers to focus 100 of their time on investment performance, not marketing (the more I think about, this is a very smart approach). Still, in private equity, PSP invests with top funds and pays hefty fees (2 and 20 is very costly so you need to choose your partners well), however, they also do a lot of co-investments (where they pay no fees or marginal fees), lowering the overall fees they pay . Andr said private equity is very labor intensive which is why hes not comfortable with purely direct investments, owning 100 of a company (said its too many headaches) and prefers investing in top funds where they also co-invest alongside them on larger transactions to lower overall fees (I totally agree with this approach in private equity for all of Canadas mighty PE investors ). But he said to do a lot of co-investments to lower overall fees, you need to hire the right people who monitor external PE funds and can analyze co-investment deals quickly to see if they are worth investing in (sometimes theyre not). He gave the example of a 300 million investment with BC Partners which led to 700 million in co-investments, lowering the overall fees (that is fantastic and exactly the right approach) . The reality is CalPERS, CalSTRS and other large US pensions do not have people that can analyze these co-investment deals quickly to invest and lower fees. Why Because their compensation is low and they cannot attract the talent to do a lot more co-investments to lower overall fees and boost the performance of their private equity program. But there is no question that PSP and other large Canadian pensions still invest a huge chunk of their private equity assets with top funds where they pay big fees in comingled funds to gain access to larger co-investment opportunities. In fact, at the end of the lunch, Neil Cunningham, PSPs Senior Vice President, Global Head of Real Estate Investments, shared his with me: On private equity fees, he agreed with Andr Bourbonnais, PSP doesnt have negotiating power with top PE funds because lets say they raise a 14 billion fund and we take a 500 million slice and negotiate a 10 basis reduction on fees, thats not 10 basis points on 500 million, thats 10 basis points on 14 billion because everyone has a most favored nation (MFN) clause . so top private equity funds dont negotiate lower fees with any pension or sovereign wealth fund. They can just go to the next fund on their list. Whether you like it or not, in order to invest properly in private equity, and make big returns over any public market benchmark over the long run, you need to pay big fees to the private equity kingpins. But if youre smart like Canadas large pensions, you will tell them Ok boys, were going to invest a lot of money in your PE funds, pay the big fees like everyone else, but youd better give us great co-investment opportunities to lower our overall fees. Sounds easy but in order for CalPERS and other large US pensions to pursue this long-overdue idea, they need to get the governance and compensation right at their shops to attract qualified people to analyze co-investment opportunities quickly and diligently. And that isnt easy . Below, Maria Bartiromo interviews CalPERS CIO Ted Eliopoulos on Fox Business Networks Mornings with Maria. Listen carefully to what he says about what they can and cannot bring in-house. The Canada News Wire reports, Canadian pensioners not living as long as expected : New research finds longevity for Canadian pensioners is lower than anticipated 8211 which may actually be costing defined benefit (DB) plan sponsors. Canadian male pensioners are living about 1.5 years less than expected from age 65, according to the latest data from Club Vita Canada Inc. 8211 the first dedicated longevity analytics firm for Canadian pension plans and a subsidiary of Eckler Ltd. Female pensioners are living about half a year less than expected . Based on our data, some DB plans are overestimating how long their members are currently living and are therefore taking an overly conservative approach to funding their liabilities, explains Ian Edelist, CEO of Club Vita Canada. Correcting that overestimation could reduce actuarial reserves by as much as 6 8211 improving Canadian pension funds and their plan sponsors balance sheets just by using more accurate, granular and up-to-date longevity assumptions. The data comes from Club Vita Canadas first annual and highly successful longevity study completed in 2016 8211 one of the largest, most rigorous research studies on the impact of longevity on defined benefit pension and post-retirement health plans . The newly created VitaBank pool of longevity data (provided by Club Vita Canada members) spans a wide range of industries and geographic regions in both the public and private sectors. VitaBank is currently tracking more than 500,000 Canadian pensioners from over 40 pension plans. Unlike the most widely used study to set longevity expectations 8211 the Canadian Pensioners Mortality (CPM) study, which relies on data up to 2008 8211 VitaBank includes fully cleaned and validated data up to 2014 . The Club Vita Canada study brings to the Canadian pension market leading-edge modelling techniques already used by the insurance industry and in other countries. Club Vita U. K. recently released similar results, noting 16325 billion could be wiped off the collective U. K. DB deficit by using more accurate longevity assumptions. Naturally, the ultimate cost of a pension plan will be determined by how long its members actually live. But assumptions made today really do matter for such long-duration commitments, explains Douglas Anderson, founder of Club Vita in the U. K. Club Vitas data gives DB plan sponsors the tools they need to evaluate their willingness to maintain their longevity risk or offload that risk to insurers. Club Vita Canada Inc. was created by Eckler Ltd. It is an extension of Club Vita LLP, a longevity centre of excellence launched in the U. K. in 2008 by Hymans Robertson LLP. By pooling robust data from a wide range of pension plans, Club Vita provides its members with leading-edge longevity analytics helping them better measure and manage their retirement plan. Eckler is a leading consulting and actuarial firm with offices across Canada and the Caribbean. Owned and operated by active Principals, the company has earned a reputation for service continuity and high professional standards. Our select group of advisers offers excellence in a wide range of areas, including financial services, pensions, benefits, communication, investment management, pension administration, change management and technology. Eckler Ltd. is a founding member of Abelica Global 8211 an international alliance of independent actuarial and consulting firms operating in over 20 countries. I recently discussed life expectancy in Canada and the United States when I went over statistics on gender and other diversity in the workplace. noting this: Statistics are a funny thing, they can be used in all sorts of ways, to inform and disinform people by stretching the truth. La meg gi deg et eksempel. Over the weekend, I went to Indigo bookstore to buy Michael Lewiss new book, The Undoing Project. and skim through other books. One of the books on the shelf that caught my attention was Daniel J. Levitins book, A Field Guide to Lies: Critical Thinking in the Information Age. Dr. Levitin is a professor of neuroscience at McGill Universitys Department of Psychology and he has written a very accessible and entertaining book on critical thinking, a subject that should be required reading for high school and university students. Anyways, there is a passage in the book where he discusses the often used statistic that the average life expectancy of people living in the 1850s was 38 years old for men and 40 years old for women, and now its 76 years old for men and 81 for women (these are the latest US statistics which show life expectancy declining for the first time since 1993. In Canada, the latest figures from 2009 show the life expectancy for men is 79 and for women 83, but bad habits are sure to impact these figures ). You read that statistic and whats the first thing that comes to your mind Wow, people didnt live long back then and now that we are all eating organic foods, exercising and have the benefits of modern medical science, we are living much longer. The problem is this is total and utter nonsense The reason why the life expectancy was much lower in 1850 was that children were dying a lot more often back then. In other words, the child mortality rate heavily skewed the statistics but according to Dr. Levitin, a man or woman reaching the age of 50 back then went on to live past 70. Yes, modern science has increased life expectancy somewhat but not nearly as much as we are led to believe. Here is another statistic that my close friend, a radiologist who sees all sorts of diseases told me: all men will get prostate cancer if they live long enough . He tells me a 70 year old man has a 70 chance of being diagnosed with prostate cancer, an 80 year old man has an 80 chance and a 90 year old man has a 90 chance. Scary stuff, right Not really because as my buddy tells me: The reason prostate cancer isnt a massive health concern is that it typically strikes older men and moves very, very slowly, so by the time men are diagnosed with it, chances are they will die from something else. Of course, the key word here is typically because if youre a 50 year old male with high PSA levels and are then diagnosed with prostate cancer after a biopsy confirms you have it, you need to undergo surgery as soon as possible because you might be one of the unlucky few with an aggressive form of the disease (luckily, it can be treated and cured if caught in time). So, much like the US, it seems the recent statistics on life expectancy in Canada are not that good. Again, you need to be very careful interpreting the data because the heroin epidemic has really skewed the numbers in both countries (much more in the US). But lets say the folks at Club Vita Canada and Eckler are doing their job well and Canadian pensioners are living less than previously thought. Does that mean that Canadian DB plans are overestimating their liabilities Yes and no. Go read an older comment of mine on whether longevity risk will doom pensions where I stated: I actually forwarded John Mauldins comment to my pension contacts yesterday to get some feedback. First, Bernard Dussault, Canadas former Chief Actuary, shared this with me: True, longevity is a scary risk, but not as much as most think, the reason being that the calculations of pension costs and liabilities in actuarial reports take into account future improvements in longevity . For example, as per the demographic assumptions of the latest (March 31, 2011) actuarial report on the federal public service superannuation plan (osfi-bsif. gc. caEngDocspssa2011.pdf ), the longevity at age 75 in 2011 is projected to gradually increase by about 1 year in 10 years (2021). For example, if longevity at age 75 was 12.5 in 2011, it is projected as per the PSSA actuarial report to be about 13.5 in 2021 This 1 year increase at age 75 over 10 years is much less than the average 1year increase at birth every 4 years over the 20th century reported by the Society of Actuaries (SOA). However, this is an appleorange comparison because longevity improvements are always larger at birth than at any later age and were much larger in the first half of the 20th century than thereafter than at any later age. Bernard added this in another email correspondence where he clarified the above statement: Annual longevity improvement rates are assumed to apply for the whole duration of the projection period under any of the periodical actuarial reports on the PSSA, i. e. for all current and future contributors and pensioners. Moreover, the federal public service superannuation plan is actuarially funded, which means that each generationcohort of contributors pays for the whole value of all of its accrued benefits. In other words, the financing of the plan is such that there is essentially no inter-generational transfer of pension debt from any cohort to the next . Second, Jim Keohane, President and CEO of the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP ), sent me his thoughts: I am not sure how longevity improvements will play out over the coming decades and neither does anyone else. I wouldnt dispute the facts being quoted in this article, but what I would point out is that these issues are not exclusive to DB plans. They are problems for anyone saving for retirement whether they are part of a DB plan a DC plan or not in any plan. DB plans get benchmarked against their ability to replace a portion of plan members pre-retirement income (typically 60). If you measured DC plans on the same basis they are in much worse shape, in fact, they only have about 20 to 25 of the assets needed to produce that level of income . I would also add that Canadian public sector pension plans are in much better shape than their U. S. Counterparts. We use realistic return assumptions and are in a much stronger funded position . Third, Jim Leech, the former CEO of Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP ) and co-author of The Third Rail. sent me this: Very consistent with my thoughtsobservations. It is a shame that short term motivations (masking reality by manipulating valuations, migration from DB to DC, elimination of workplace plans altogether, kicking the can down the road, etc) have taken over what is supposed to be a long horizon instrument (pension plan) . But Jim Keohane makes a good point - this applies ONLY to DB valuations . Anyone with DC (RRSP), ie. most Canadians, is really jiggered by longevity increases. No doubt about it, the Oracle of Ontario. HOOPP and other Canadian pensions use much more realistic return assumptions to discount their future liabilities. In fact, Neil Petroff, CIO at Ontario Teachers once told me bluntly: If U. S. public pensions were using our discount rate, theyd be insolvent. Mauldin raises issues Ive discussed extensively on my blog, including what if 8 is really 0. the pension rate-of-return fantasy. how useless investment consultants have hijacked U. S. pension funds, how longevity risk is adding to the pressures of corporate and public defined-benefit (DB) pensions. Mauldin isnt the first to sound the alarm and he wont be the last. Warren Buffetts dire warning on pensions fell largely on deaf ears as did Bridgewaters. I knew a long time ago that the pension crisis and jobs crisis were going to be the two main issues plaguing policymakers around the world. And Ive got some very bad news for you, when global deflation hits us. it will decimate pensions. Thats where I part ways with Mauldin because longevity risk, while important, is nothing compared to a substantial decline in real interest rates. Importantly, a decline in real rates, especially now when rates are at historic lows, is far more detrimental to pension deficits than people living longer . What else did Mauldin conveniently miss He ignores the brutal truth on DC pensions and misses how the inexorable shift to DC pensions will exacerbate inequality and pretty much condemn millions of Americans to more pension poverty. The important point is that last one, a decline in interest rates is far, far more damaging to pension liabilities than an increase in longevity risk. Last year, I wrote a comment on why ultra low rates are here to stay. and San Francisco Fed President John Williams penned a note today that pretty much agrees with me: The decline in the natural rate of interest, or r-star, over the past decade raises three important questions. First, is this low level for the real short-term interest rate unique to the U. S. economy Second, is the natural rate likely to remain low in the future And third, is this low level confined to 8220safe8221 assets In answer to these questions, evidence suggests that low r-star is a global phenomenon, is likely to be very persistent, and is not confined only to safe assets . So, if you ask me, I wouldnt read too much into this latest study stating Canadian pensioners are living less than previously thought and Canadian DB plans are overestimating their liabilities (persistent low rates persistent pension deficits). Worse still, the stakeholders of these DB plans might take this data and twist it to their advantage by asking to lower the contribution rate of their plans. This would be a grave mistake. Lastly, I want to bring something to your attention. Last week, after I wrote my comment on a lunch with PSPs Andr Bourbonnais. where I stated that the Chief Actuary of Canada is rightly looking into whether PSPs 4.1 real return target is too high, I received an email from Bernard Dussault, Canadas former Chief Actuary, stating he didnt agree with me or others that PSPs target rate of return needs to be lowered. Specifically, Bernard shared this with me: I still do not understand why suddenly investment experts (including Keith Ambachtsheer) think that the expectedassumed long term real rate of return will decrease compared to what it has been expectedassumed for so many years in the past. I look forward to Bourbonnais and the Chief Actuarys rationale if they were to reduce the 4.1 rate below 4.0. The rationale I used for the 4 I assumed for the CPP and the PSPP when I was the Chief Actuary is briefly described as follows in the 16th actuarial report on the CPP : The CPP Account is made of two components: the Operating Balance, which corresponds in size to the benefit payments expected over the next three months, and the Fund, which represents the excess of all CPP assets over the Operating Balance. In accordance with the new policy of investing the Fund in a diversified portfolio, the ultimate real interest rate assumed on future net cash flows to the Account is 3.8. This rate is a constant weighted average of the real unchanged rate of 1.5 assumed on the Operating Balance and of the real rate of 4 which replaces the rate of 2.5 assumed on the Fund in previous actuarial reports. The long term real rate of interest of 4 on the Fund was assumed taking into account the following factors: from 1966 to 1995, the average real yield on the Qubec Pension Plan (QPP) account, which has always been invested in a diversified portfolio, is close to 4 as reported in the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) annual report on Canadian Economic Statistics, the average real yield over the period of 25 years ending in 1996 on the funds of a sample of the largest private pension plans in Canada is close to 5, resulting from a nominal yield of about 11.0 reduced by the average increase of about 6 in the Consumer Price Index using historical results published by the CIA in the Report on Canadian Economic Statistics, the real average yield over the 50-year (43 in the case of mortgages) period ending in 1994 is 4.03 in respect of an hypothetical portfolio invested equally in each of the following five areas: conventional mortgages, long term federal bonds (Government of Canada bonds with a term to maturity of at least 20 years), Government of Canada 91-day Treasury Bills, domestic equities (Canadian common stocks) and non8209domestic equities (U. S. common stocks). The assumed real rate of 4 retained for the Fund is therefore deemed realistic but erring on the safe side, especially considering that: replacing federal bonds by provincial bonds in this model portfolio would increase the average yield to the extent that provincial bonds carry a higher return than federal bonds and the 3-month Treasury Bills, which bear lower returns, would normally be invested for the Operating Balance rather than the Fund. From a larger perspective, assuming a real yield of 4 on the CPP Fund means that the CPP Investment Board would be expected to achieve investment returns comparable to those of the QPP and of large private pension plans. On the other hand, I think I heard Bourbonnais saying last year at a presentation of the PSP annual report to the Public Service Pension advisory Committee (and I could well have misheard or misinterpreted what he said) that he was reducing the proportion of equities in the PSP fund in order to reduce the volatilityfluctuation of the returns. If he is really doing this, then that would be a valid reason for reducing the expected 4.1 return . Besides, if he is doing this, I opine that this is not consistent with the PSP objective to maximize returns. Indeed, a more risky investment portfolio carries higher volatility though BUT it is coupled with a higher long term average return (which both the CPP and the PSP funds have achieved on average over at least the last 15 years). As I explained to Bernard, PSP Investments and other large Canadian pensions are indeed reducing their proportion in public equities precisely because in a historically low rate environment, the returns on public equities will be lower and more importantly, the volatility will be much higher . I also told him that given my long-term forecast of global deflation, I think more and more US and Canadian pensions should lower their target rate and that the contribution rates should rise. Of course, someone may claim the only reason PSP and others want to lower their actuarial target rate of return is because it lowers their bar to attain their bogey and collect millions in compensation. Im not that cynical, I think there are legitimate reasons to review this target rate of return and I look forward to seeing the Chief Actuarys report to understand his logic and why he thinks it needs to be lowered. I would also warn all of you to take GMOs 7-year asset class return projections with a shaker of salt (click on image below): GMO may be right but I never bought into this nonsense and Im not about to begin now. I guarantee you seven years from now, they will be way off once more Below, Goldman isnt buying into 2017s bull market hype. They must be reading my comments but remember what I told you last Friday when I went over top funds Q4 activity. the real risk in these markets is another melt-up, even if its a slow, insidious one, to shake all those shorts out and force portfolio managers underperforming their index to chase returns by buying risk assets at higher valuations. Thats when the real fun begins but dont worry, were not there yet. About This Blog Contact Information This blog was created to share my unique insights on pensions and investments. The success of the blog is due to the high volume of readers and excellent insights shared by senior pension fund managers and other experts. Institutional and retail investors are kindly requested to support my efforts by donating or subscribing via PayPal below. to get latest updates, even during the day, click on the image of the big piggy bank at the top of the blog. For all inquiries, please c ontact me at LKolivakisgmail. I am an independent senior economist and pension and investment analyst with years of experience working on the buy and sell-side. I have researched and invested in traditional and alternative asset classes at two of the largest public pension funds in Canada, the Caisse de dpt et placement du Qubec (Caisse) and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments). Ive also consulted the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada on the governance of the Federal Public Service Pension Plan (2007) and been invited to speak at the Standing Committee on Finance (2009) and the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Commerce and Trade (2010) to discuss Canadas pension system. You can follow my blog posts on your Bloomberg terminal and track me on Twitter (PensionPulse) where I post many links to pension and investment articles as well as my market thoughts and other articles of interest. Thank You Id like to thank all of you who support this blog, I truly appreciate it. Institutional investors can subscribe using one of the three options below (contact me for details). Anyone else can contribute any amount at any time through the donate button (a tip). Please take the time to show your financial support for the work that goes into this blog. 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